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OFF-BALANCE SHEET ACTIVITIES 
OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Ma. Socorro V. Zingapan, Mario B. Lamberte 
and Josef T. Yap 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Off-balance sheet (OBS) banking refers to those activities of commercial banks that generate 
income without expanding the asset portion of their standard balance sheet. In many cases, these 
activities also involve the creation of contingent claims against the banks; hence they are also 
referred to as contingent accounts. 
OBS activities of commercial banks in the Philippines may be grouped into four: 
1. Trade-related guarantees and foreign exchange services which include commercial and 
standby letters of credit (SL/Cs), future (or forward) exchange commitments, spot 
exchange commitments, and guarantees other than SL/Cs; 
2. Fiduciary operations which refer to the banks' trust accounts and managed funds (or 
funds held under management); 
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3. Investment banking-related accounts which include government securities held on 
consignment by banks, government and private securities held under custodian 
arrangements as part of their quasi-banking functions, etc; and 
4. Payments and safekeeping accounts which consist of bills for collection, and items held 
for safekeeping and custodianship other than those administered by the trust departments. 
The above list, which covers only those that have been monitored by the Central Bank (CB), 
are seemingly less sophisticated than those observed in other countries. For example, Singapore 
banks have options, financial futures, and revolving underwriting facilities (Adhikary 1987). 
However, that the CB listing could be incomplete since there are recently-developed facilities 
that remain unmonitored, e.g., capital funds. 
OBS banking in the Philippines is not a new phenomenon. CB policies on some OBS 
activities (e.g., opening of letters of credit) are noted to have been issued as early as 1959. 
However, some have grown at faster rates than traditional on- balance sheet accounts in recent 
years. Their growing importance as sources of income has also been noted.1 This development 
brings to the fore two issues: the causes of their growth and their effect on the risk profile of 
banks that engage in them. 
The literature on OBS banking in the US make a distinction between regulatory and 
non-regulatory motives on banks for shifting to OBS transactions.2 Two hypotheses explain the 
regulatory motives: (1) the regulatory tax hypothesis and (2) the moral hazard hypothesis. The 
former is more frequently cited. It argues that OBS activities provide banks a way of avoiding 
regulations related to reserve requirements and bank capital adequacy requirements. Although the 
CB imposes regulations on some aspects of the cited OBS activities, such as deposit requirement 
for trust and managed funds, these (OBS) remain unaccounted in capital adequacy standards. 
The moral hazard hypothesis points out that a bank can enhance or generate the subsidies 
associated with fixed rate deposit guarantees by engaging in OBS activities. When deposit 
guarantees are provided at fixed rates, i.e., the rates are independent of the riskiness of the bank's 
portfolio, a bank can increase its financial leverage by having more contingent liabilities, thus 
increasing whatever subsidies it receives from the insurer (the Philippine Deposit Insurance 
Corporation). Non-regulatory factors may also have provided incentives for banks, e.g., the 
desire to diversify their loan and investments portfolio. James (1987) uses standby letters of 
credit as an example. SL/Cs permit banks to separate the interest rate risk from the credit risk 
1. For example, income from trust services alone have accounted for seven percent of the commercial banks' non-interest-
income from 1986; this is an improvement of the six percent recorded in 1985 and three percent in 1984 (World Bank 1988). 
Earlier, Lamberte (1982) included contingent accounts as one of the outputs in his multiproduct joint cost functions of banks. He 
found that the marginal cost curve for this variable monotonically declining, suggesting cost advantages to be gained by banks by 
expanding the volume of this output, 
2. See James (1987) for a detailed discussion. 
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associated with a loan; with an SL/C issue, a bank can underwrite the credit risk while the 
beneficiary bears the risk of any change in the value of the loan caused by interest rate changes. 
The second issue concerns the effect of OBS activities on the risk profile of banks 
undertaking them. As mentioned earlier, off-balance sheet activities among Philippine 
commercial banks, as in other countries, are not reflected in the regulatory definitions of capital 
adequacy; this makes the interpretation of banks' exposure to a particular risk less clear. Note 
that OBS activities generate three types of risks - market/position risks, credit risks, and 
operational/control risks -- which affect the liquidity and solvency (capital adequacy) of banks as 
do their normal or on-balance sheet operations. 
As of year-end 1988, the total off-balance sheet accounts of commercial banks reached 
P160,615 million, which is equivalent to 53.7 percent of their total balance sheet accounts 
(Table 1). Contingent accounts due to the banks' provision of trade-related services dominated 
those which were generated by their fiduciary and investment banking functions. The major 
OBS accounts in 1978-1988 were future exchange contracts (40.1 percent), trust accounts (22.5 
percent), import letters of credit (12.4 percent), bills for collection (9.5 percent), and funds held 
under management (9.1 percent). 
During the same period, the total nominal value of these OBS accounts grew annually at the 
average rate of 18.1 percent, which is slightly higher than the 17.6 percent recorded for their total 
traditional balance sheet accounts. Among several OBS categories, contingent accounts due to 
the fiduciary functions of banks grew remarkably (Table 2). Funds under management had an 
almost six-fold increase in 1987 alone and grew by 43.3 percent in 1988. Similarly, trust 
accounts expanded by 31.8 percent in 1988. 
This paper is an attempt to shed some light on the major OBS activities of commercial banks 
in the Philippines. Due to data limitations, the paper focuses on the trust and funds management 
accounts which have grown most rapidly in recent years, although a brief discussion on 
trade-related OBS activities is presented in Part II. The implications of the fiduciary facilities on 
several areas are studied in Part III: First, their possible effect on the solvency and liquidity risks 
Of banks are looked into. Second, their effect on the structure of the banking industry is studied. 
Since these are in essence alternatives to the traditional deposits and deposit substitutes in raising 
funds from surplus units, a competitive structure would be preferred to a set-up where only a few 
banks dominate. Evidence on this, however, show the opposite. The trust industry is less 
competitive than the commercial banking industry itself or the industry structure based on 
balance sheet operations which is already suspected of being oligopolistic (Tan 1989). 
Finally, the implications of the fiduciary functions on the tenability of some supervisor 
requirements are also considered. The growth of OBS activities and their effects on bank risk 
suggest that the CB should adopt more appropriate measures for risk assessment rather than 
3. Ideally, the impact of OBS banking in general could have been considered on the riskiness of the banks using the 
methodologies employed by US researchers such as Goldberg & Llyod Davis (1985), James (1987), and Bennet (1987). Bank 
specific data, however, are severely limited to permit this. 
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impose higher reserve requirements. The latter may only encourage the trustee banks to engage 
in more risky (and higher yielding) transactions to compensate for the reduction in income due to 
these required deposits on trust and managed funds. 
II. TRADE -RELATED OFF-BALANCE SHEET ACCOUNTS 
A. Nature of Letters of Credit and Future Exchange Contracts 
Letters of credit (L/Cs) and future exchange covers are the two major trade-related OBS 
facilities of commercial banks. Under the letter of credit, the bank agrees to pay to the 
beneficiary (the party who is entitled to draw under the credit) against that party's presentation of 
documents stipulated in the L/Cs. There are two basic types of L/Cs: commercial and stand-by. 
Commercial L/Cs are used to finance the movement or storage of goods and are normally 
payable by the bank after it receives documents conveying title to the goods. Commercial L/Cs 
being issued by Philippine commercial banks include: (1) domestic and foreign L/Cs which may 
be drawable by sight drafts or term (usance) drafts, (2) deferred L/Cs which provide for drawings 
on installment basis, (3) revolving L/Cs which are automatically reinstated within a fixed period, 
and (4) export L/Cs which are opened by foreign importers in favor of local exporters and which 
are received from foreign correspondent banks and confirmed by the local bank. 
Standby L/Cs do not involve movement of goods and are generally payable to the beneficiary 
following a financial default by the account party in the nonperformance of a contractual 
obligation. In essence, a standby L/C is established as a guarantee that a business transaction will 
be performed. 
There are several apparent reasons for the "growth" of letters of credit. From the demand side 
of the market, L/Cs have evolved primarily in response to traders' need for guarantees which 
banks conveniently provided. The L/Cs importance in trade and financial transactions is due, to 
firstly, the bank having better information than the beneficiaries and, secondly, the belief that 
L/Cs generally eliminate risk. 
The growth of these contingent accounts could be associated, generally, with developments 
in the country's domestic and international trade. Import L/Cs were endorsed by the CB, through 
Circular 808 on June 26, 1981, requiring all importations valued at more than US$1,000.00 to be 
covered by letters of credit. The same requirement is imposed on importations valued at less than 
US$1,000.00 where it is shown that: (1) there is more than one importation of the same 
commodity category from the same supplier, (2) the aggregate value of the importations exceed 
US$1,000.00, and (3) the importations were shipped/mailed on the same or successive date/s. 
Export L/Cs have also become indispensable in the export financing system, e.g., the 
rediscounting schemes of the CB. 
The banks' sales and purchases of future (forward) exchange are important to traders and 
those with transactions involving a foreign currency because these enable them to hedge against 
the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. This facility also serves the purpose of speculators or those 
7 
who hope to gain from betting on the future value of a currency. A speculator can buy a future 
exchange from a bank from which he profits if spot rates rise at the maturity date of the contract. 
Thus, the demand for future exchange is primarily influenced by the stability or instability of the 
peso vis-a-vis foreign currencies which, in turn, are subject to the condition of the country's 
current accounts or balance of payments. For speculators, the interest rates prevailing in other 
countries are also important. But, since the Philippine capital market is not integrated 
internationally, the interest rate differential is not as important as the exchange rate movement. 
This is shown in the following ordinary least squares estimation of the future exchange purchases 
by commercial banks during the period 1978-1988: 
FEB = 18440.672 + 109808.87 DEPN + 86.61 IRD 
(8.68) (6.38) (0.33) 
R2 = .893 F= 42.60 
FEB : future exchange bought in pesos 
DEPN : average depreciation rate of the peso vs. US$ or the change in the price 
(exchange rate) the future exchange purchases. 
IRD : difference of average 3-month LIBOR and 91-day Treasury bill rates. In most 
years, the LIBOR rate is lower than the T-bill rates, hence the positive sign of the 
coefficient. 
Commercial banks had future exchange contracts with the CB until 1984, along with their 
other customers. Although there is no available data from the CB, a substantive portion of the 
commercial banks' total future exchange contracts were most likely commitments with the CB. 
This is consistent with the observation that the commercial banks' annual "future exchange 
bought" always exceeded "future exchange sold" (Table 1). Normally, commercial banks buy 
future exchange from exporters, "bear speculators," and the CB, while they sell to importers and 
"bull" speculators. If most of these were direct transactions with traders, it is expected that 
"future exchange sold" should have been greater than "future exchange bought," at some years at 
least since our imports consistently exceeded our exports. 
The CB ceased providing new forward covers since October 14, 1984. What has remained is 
the renewal of outstanding contracts. This policy partly explains the decline in the future 
exchange purchases of commercial banks after 1984: these declined sharply by 54.7 percent in 
1985 and by 24.5 percent in 1986. The absence of new forward cover protection by the CB could 
be explained in the light of the losses it absorbed from the devaluation of the peso, especially 
during the BQP crisis years (1983 and 1984). The exchange rate, which stood at 9.29 in January 
1983, jacked up by more than 100 percent to reach 19.9 by December 1984. The World Bank 
Financial Report (1988) estimated the losses from forward covers of the Central Banks, as 
reflected in its balance sheet (part of an item called "Revaluation of International Reserves") as of 
1985, to be P22.4 billion or 52.83 percent of its total assets. The continued operation of the 
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facility would ,also have made more difficult for CB to agree to or recommend devaluation if this 
meant more losses from forward covers. 
B. Implications on Bank Risk 
In looking into the possible effects of the letters of credit on the bank's solvency and liquidity 
risk, two policies have to be considered: (1) a policy requiring marginal deposits or security 
before L/Cs are issued would minimize the adverse effects of L/Cs on the bank's solvency and 
may, in fact, improve the short-term liquidity profile of the bank (cash marginal deposits would 
increase the liquid assets of the bank); and (2) a policy imposing reserve requirement on the 
marginal deposit would negate the positive effects of these deposits on the bank's liquidity. 
Presently, marginal deposit rates for commercial L/Cs are not imposed by the CB but are 
subject to the individual bank's policy. Generally, the rates, which range from zero to fifty 
percent, would differ depending on the bank's relationship with the account party and the 
commodity being traded. The CB, however, imposes reserve requirements on the marginal 
deposits of import L/Cs; their rates had been determined in relation to monetary policy. During 
the BOP crisis in 1983, for example, the rates for all categories of commodities were increased to 
100 percent, supposedly to reinforce other anti- inflation policies. The rate was reduced in 1987 
to 50 percent (Table 3). 
In the absence of CB-imposed marginal deposit requirements, the main regulatory instrument 
of the authorities for L/Cs is the inclusion of outstanding L/Cs (regular, standby, deferred) less 
marginal deposits, as well as outstanding guarantees in the single borrower's loan limit (Circular 
857 dated March 5, 1982).4 For standby SL/Cs, CB requires that total SL/C accommodations, 
including guarantees, should not exceed 50 percent of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus. 
Also, all SL/C issuances, including those in favor of the government should be done on a secured 
basis. Security may be in the form of (1) real mortgage and/or bonds/securities issued or 
guaranteed by the CB, (2) other forms of collateral such as hold-out on deposits or assignments 
of contract receivables, and (3) a second mortgage on real estate provided that the loanable value 
in excess of the first mortgage loan is sufficient to cover the amount of the L/C under the second 
mortgage. 
One simple way of evaluating the effect of L/Cs on the risk profile of banks is to look into the 
SL/Cs and networth ratio of commercial banks on which data is available for the period 1983-
1987. From 1983 to 1986, the ratio ranged from 55.6 percent (1986) to 68.1 percent (1985); the 
ratio dramatically declined to 14.7 percent in 1987 due to the drop in outstanding SL/Cs from 
PI 1.2 billion in 1986 to merely P3.3 billion (Table 4). These proportions exceeded the 50 percent 
ceiling imposed by CB, although there could have been SL/Cs which were fully secured by cash 
4. Exemption from the single borrower's limit include: (1) L/Cs to guarantee construction contracts abroad of Philippine 
firms, (2) L/Cs for the account of government-owned or controlled corporations which are fully guaranteed by the national 
government or its instrumentalities, (3) L/Cs guaranteed by PhilGuarantee and other government agencies, and (4) L/Cs to 
guarantee construction of local projects that are foreign- assisted and internationally bid, the contract for which have been wort by 
Philippine contractors. 
5. Exemption from the 50 percent limit include SL/Cs fully secured by cash, hold-out on deposit/deposit substitutes, or 
government securities. 
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Table 10 
Required Reserves on Margin Deposits on 
Import Letters of Credit (L7Cs) 
Circular Date Required Reserves 
Clrc, 852 Feb. 15,1982 For import IVCs opened on or before March 1,1982: 
Reserves (%) Effective date 
90 3-1-82 
80 4-1-82 
70 5-1-82 
60 6-1-82 
50 7-1-82 
Circ. 968 Nov. 2, 1983 100% for all categories 
Circ. 1136 Feb. 27,1987 50% for all categories 
Source: Central Bank Annual Report, various years. 
Table 4 
Standby Letters of Credit (SUCs) and Net Worth of Commercial Banks, 
Year-End 1983-1987 (in million pesos) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
SL/Cs 10768 13556 11784 11169 3316 
Net Worth 18178 22449 17312 20098 22586 
SLC/Net Worth (%) 59.24 60.39 68.07 55.57 14.68 
Source of basic data: Central Bank of the Philippines; 
Annual PNB Reports on the Commercial Banking System. 
10 
and other liquid assets. Heightening this adverse effect on the capital adequacy of banks is the 
fact that the CB does not have penalties for banks that exceed the ceilings. Moreover, the 
operational definition of the networth to risk ratio, which is the basic ratio monitored by CB for 
supervision purposes, excludes SL/Cs as well as other contingent accounts. 
Theoretically, however, there is no a priori reason to expect that SL/Cs and other OBS 
activities increase the default risk of deposits. James (1987) argues that this would depend on the 
reasons why banks undertake those activities. The moral hazard hypothesis suggests that these 
could provide a way for a bank to increase leverage and hence increase the risk of deposits when: 
(1) the deposits are subjected to a fixed rate deposit insurance pricing, and (2) the OBS activities 
are not subject to capital requirements. On the other hand, an alternative explanation points to 
the possibility that SL/Cs permit banks to engage in lending in areas that they would find 
unprofitable (though less risky) to undertake if they were restricted to funding loans through 
deposit financing. The implicit assumption of this argument is that deposit financing is more 
costly; thus undertaking it should yield higher returns which are most likely the riskier ones too. 
Of the two possibilities, however, the evidence on the negative effect of SL/Cs on the capital 
adequacy of commercial banks support the contention that SL/Cs have exposed the banks' 
depositors to greater risk. 
in. TRUST AND FUNDS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS 
A. Nature of Trust and Fund Management Operations 
Trust and funds management operations of banks are generated by the principal 
(trustors/funds owner)-agent. The agent administers, holds, and manages the funds and/or 
property for the use, benefit or advantage of the principal or the beneficiaries. This basic feature 
is present under both trust and funds management operations. Under trust, however, the trustee 
has the general authority and responsibility to the administer and manage the trust account, i.e., 
the bank itself formulates policies regarding the investment and disposition of funds, subject to 
restrictions provided in the agreement establishing the trust. Under funds management, the 
trustee bank acts only as an agent or representative of the fund owner, without obtaining legal 
title to the property. The agreement binding the management has the following features set by the 
CB: 
(1) Risk sharing: In trust agreements, the risk or responsibility in case of loss in the 
investment of funds will be shared between the two parties. In funds management, no such 
feature is explicitly prescribed, but it is implied by the policy on the agent's fees and 
commissions; 
(2) Expected income: The principal (trustor) shall not be promised a fixed rate of return or 
income, except when the specified use of the funds have such return; 
(3) Agent's fees: This shall be based on the basis of the cost of services rendered and 
"responsibilities assumed," and not on some excess over a target return. 
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As of 1989, the banks authorized to engage in trust and fund management operations included 
the twenty-five domestic commercial banks, one local branch of a foreign bank (Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation [HSBC]), the three specialized government banks (Development 
Bank of the Philippines, Land Bank and Philippine Amanah Bank [PAB]), and eight thrift banks. 
So far, HSBC and PAB have not exercised this authority. As of year- end 1988, trust assets of 
commercial banks (except for the branches of foreign banks) relative to their total balance sheet 
assets ranged from one percent (Philippine National Bank) to 40 percent (Citytrust). Measured 
in terms of their deposit liabilities, these ranged from 1.2 percent (Philippine National Bank) to 
75.5 percent (Citytrust). (Table 5) 
A summary of the trust and fund management operations of commercial and specialized 
government banks from 1984 to 1988 are presented in Tables 6-9. There are four major types of 
trust accounts: (1) personal private trusts, (2) corporate or institutional trusts, (3) common or 
commingled trust plans, and (4) agencies other than investment management agencies (IMAs).6 
For the period 1984-1988, most of the trust accounts of commercial banks were sourced from 
common trust plans (42.8 percent) and corporate/institutional trust accounts (46.2 percents); 
specialized government banks (SGBs) held mostly corporate trust accounts (92 percent). Under 
fund management operations, the accountabilities of commercial banks and SGBs were mostly 
due to IMAs. 
Commercial banks funnelled most of their trust accounts to investments in the money market 
(28.6 percent) and loans (26.1 percent). Their funds management operations also favored loans 
(44.8 percent) and investments in money markets (24.9 percent). Other trust assets of commercial 
banks were invested in bonds and other debt instruments (15.8 percent), cash and deposit in 
banks (14.5 percent), investments in short-term stocks (3.7 percent), real estate investments (1.4 
percent) and equity investments (one percent). 
Specialized government banks also had most of their trust assets loaned out (40.2 percent) 
and invested in the money market (38.9 percent). A substantial part of their assets under fund 
management were invested in bonds and other debt instruments (63.2 percent). 
Recently, interest in fiduciary accounts have focused on their effect on the risk they bear on 
commercial banks' operations. Trust accounts are also suspected of being increasingly used to 
engage in normal banking activities (lending and investing) on an off-balance sheet basis, thereby 
providing the banks convenient means to bypass reserve requirements and other regulations, as 
well as opportunities to further strengthen their dominance in the banking industry. Finally, 
another important issue relates to their effects on savings mobilization: have these attracted 
savings outside of the formal financial market or have these been merely substitutes for less 
attractive financial assets? 
6. Investment management agreements/agencies (IMAs) represent accountabilities of the trustee bank under agreements 
whereby the trustor (individuals, corporate, or commingled) grants full or limited discretionary authority to the trustee to invest 
trust funds in assets enumerated in the covering investment management agreements. 
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Table 12 
Trust Assets and Accountabilities of Commercial Banks 
(in million pesps) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Assets 11260 15453 22457 21602 27575 
Cash, checks, and other 
cash items & deposits 
in banks 
2638 3101 1890 2981 3626 
Loans 3108 3006 5784 5894 7827 
Investments in 
money market 1638 4898 9744 4846 6999 
Investments in 
short-term stocks 397 356 606 1089 1183 
Investments in bonds 
and other debt 
instruments 255 2966 3686 3424 4240 
Long-term equity 
investments 303 296 115 58 44 
Real estate investments 214 307 269 340 299 
Miscellaneous assets 2657 523 363 2970 3357 
Accountabilities 11260 15453 22457 21602 27575 
Private trust 2274 1452 1272 1483 1797 
Corporate/ 
Institutional 5356 8572 11636 9244 10585 
Agencies other 
than Investment Management 
Agencies (IMAs) 
14 64 269 279 393 
Common trust plans 3183 4981 9032 10448 14456 
Others 433 384 248 148 344 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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Table 10 
Fund Management Assets and Accountabilities 
of Commercial Banks (in million pesos) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Assets 6837 9484 11395 16657 23624 
Cash, checks, and other cash 
items & deposits in banks 
754 982 3187 716 1539 
Loans 2738 2579 3187 9241 12718 
Investments in 
money market 1444 2921 4332 3473 4767 
Investments in 
short-term stocks 159 619 839 580 731 
Investments in bonds 
and other debt 
instruments • 1207 1723 1294 1845 2996 
Long-term equity 
investments 194 200 203 3 -
Real estate investments 64 54 91 58 263 
Miscellaneous assets 277 406 380 741 610 
Accountabilities 6837 9484 11395 16657 23624 
Investment Management 
Agencies (IMAs) 6058 7629 10391 15922 20489 
Others 779 1855 1004 735 3135 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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Table 10 
Trust Assets and Accountabilities of Specialized 
Government Banks (in million pesos) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Assets 1534 1771 2119 3040 2686 
Cash, checks, and other cash 
items & deposits in banks 102 147 155 61 68 
Loans 574 620 789 1008 1489 
Investments in 
money market 440 610 869 1678 739 
Investments in 
short-term stocks 38 
Investments in bonds 
and other debt 
instruments 40 168 18 37 
Long-term equity 
investments 167 - 187 175 174 
Real estate investments - - - - -
Miscellaneous assets 211 188 101 118 179 
Accountabilities 1534 1771 2119 3040 2686 
Private trust 18 30 86 319 140 
Corporate/ 
Institutional 1515 1741 2033 2721 2247 
Agencies other 
than IMAs (Investment 
Management Agencies) 
1 - - - 289 
Common trust plans - - • 10 
Others 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
Table 12 
Fund Management Assets and Accountabilities of Specialized 
Government Banks (in million pesos) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Assets 807 690 406 479 1127 
Cash, checks, and other cash 
items & deposits in banks 
Loans 
Investments in 
money market 
Investments in 
short-term stocks 
Investments in bonds 
and other debt 
instruments 
Long-term equity 
investments 
3 
108 
76 
560 
2 
108 
76 
458 
77 
108 
76 
110 
108 
76 
254 
2 
152 
76 
837 
Real estate investments -
Miscellaneous assets 60 46 35 41 60 
Accountabilities 
Investment Management 
Agencies (IMAs) 807 690 406 479 1127 
Others -
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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B. Regulatory Explanations for the Growth of Trust Funds 
The demand for trust and funds management accounts are in essence demand for the 
commercial banks' management service. Properties are turned over to the banks with the 
expectation that these are held, operated, or managed in an optimal manner than if these were 
held or managed by the owners or trustors themselves. The trustors benefit from the bank's 
ability to minimize transaction cost through economies of scale and scope. Banks are also 
expected to absorb part of the investment risk; thus trust operations may also be seen as 
risk-reducing facilities. 
In the 1980s, trust and fund management accounts emerged as convenient means of evading 
regulatory taxes particularly reserve requirements. The upsurge of trust and funds management 
accounts in commercial banks started in 1985 when these grew by 31.1 percent over the previous 
year's level and when sharp reductions in deposit substitutes were also recorded (Figure 1). After 
the 1981 Dewey Dee crisis,7 which adversely affected the money market, deposit substitutes 
grew by merely 0.7 percent in 1982 and 3.3 percent in 1983; Thereafter, these contracted at the 
average annual rate of 31.3 percent during the period 1984 to 1988. Meanwhile, trust and fund 
management accounts of commercial banks expanded at the average rate of 29 percent from 1985 
to 1988. The possible shifting of large depositors' funds from deposit substitutes to trust and 
fund management accounts may be explained by the increase in reserve requirement for deposit 
substitutes which reached 24 percent in 1984 as against only 10 percent for common trust funds 
and none for other trust plans. 
Also, trust operations are alledged to have been used by banks in circumventing reserve 
requirements on traditional deposits. The practice is to put pooled or individual deposits in 
excess of P100,000 in the bank's trust departments (World Bank 1988). These are then invested 
in time deposits with maturities of more than 730 days which are subject to only five percent 
reserve requirement as against the 21 percent imposed on shorter-term deposits. Banks have also 
been reported to transfer loan accounts to their trust departments in order tp facilitate compliance 
(albeit in a roundabout manner) with regulations on their loan portfolio, e.g., agri-agra law which 
directs banks to lend 25 percent of their loanable funds to agricultural/agrarian reform loans. 
Moreover, the gross receipts tax which is imposed on all interests, commissions, and 
discounts from lending activities of banks would not apply to income from trust loans and 
investments since these do not accrue to the banks themselves. Placement of funds in the banks' 
trust departments also provides the trustors or fund owners a way of shielding themselves from 
higher income tax rates, i.e., they are subjected to a 20 percent final tax as compared to a 35 
percent tax if they lend out directly and reported the same income in their income tax returns. 
7. Mr. Dee was a prominent businessman who left the country in January 1981. He left behind unpaid debts of about P635 
million, triggering a massive wave of preterm inations, i.e. investors recalled their money market placements before maturity date 
(This is discussed in Yap et al. [1990] and Lamberte [1989J). 
8. A deposit of P250.000 is required on each P35.5 million or a fraction thereof, of trust assets and managed funds in excess 
of P142 million. An additional deposit of 10 percent of common trust funds is also required. 
Figure 1 
Trust Funds and Deposit Substitutes, 1975-1988 
(in billion pesos) 
• Tiui Rnk t Dapealt Bi4»llh*M 
Trust & Managed Deposit 
Year Funds of KBs Substitutes 
1978 5.332 11.4939 
1979 8.337 11.9509 
1980 13.562 12.3714 
1981 17.083 16.4522 
1982 16.134 16.5656 
1983 21.124 17.1063 
1984 18.577 11.2757 
1985 24.347 8.6085 
1986 33.825 4.8745 
1987 37.575 3.6054 
1988 50.708 2.5342 
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C. Implications on Solvency and Liquidity Risks 
Risks arising from fiduciary lending and investments is to be shared between the bank and 
trustor, as per CB policy. In practice, however, these have been assumed by the bank. The World 
Bank Report (1988) cites the sale of uncollectible papers of the trust department to the bank 
proper which is not subject to regulation. Both the solvency and liquidity of the balance sheet 
operations are thus adversely affected. 
The usual measure employed by the CB in monitoring the solvency (capital adequacy) of 
banks is the net worth to risk asset ratio, which should have a minimum of 10 percent for 
commercial banks, 8 percent for those with net worth of P500 million, and 6 percent for those 
with a P700 million net worth. The incremental effect of the trust operations on this ratio in 5 
commercial banks is presented based on their list of what constitutes risky assets.9 A reduction 
of the net worth to risk asset ratio, from a range of less than 1 to 4 percentage points, is noted for 
this sample (Table 10). These are quite important for banks which are already highly leveraged. 
Note that the total risky assets of the banks' fiduciary departments approximate the amount of 
uncollectible papers that can be sold or passed on to the bank proper if these indeed become 
uncollectible. 
To address the potential solvency problems that trust operations may generate, the CB 
imposed limitations on the management of trust funds, the disposition of which are left to the 
discretion of the trustee banks. Loans and investments of such trust funds are limited to: (1) 
loans secured by a hold-out on, assignment or pledge of deposits, deposit substitutes, mortgage, 
chattel mortgage bonds, and pledge of gold or silver bullions; (2) secured medium-term loans 
(with maturities of up to three years) for livestock breeding and production; (3) secured loans 
(with maturities up to five years) for acquisition of fertilizers and any instrument/machinery; (4) 
first mortgage loans; (5) high grade bonds and other evidence of indebtedness, etc. Loans are 
also subject to rules on the loan limit to a single borrower, including those for DOSRI (directors, 
officers, stockholders, and related interests). 
For fund management accounts, the CB also stipulates that, except as may be provided by the 
agreement with fund owners, 75 percent of these funds shall be invested in diverse securities 
which are acceptable as collateral under CB rules including government securities underwritten 
by the bank. 
However, the above rules (except the single borrower's limit) are binding only to a certain 
portion of the bank's trust and funds management operations, i.e., these would not cover some 
9. Risk assets is defined as total assets minus: (1) cash on hand; (2) amount due from the CB; (3) securities and other 
evidence of indebtedness of the government; (4) loans secured by deposits, government securities, deposit substitutes maintained 
in the bank and by PhilGuarantee; (5) loans or acceptances under L/Cs covered by margin deposits; (6) bank premises, furnitures-
fixtures, and equipment (depreciated); (7) balances with PNB for clearing checks drawn on banks not serviced by the CB; (8) the 
equivalent of at most 30 percent of outstanding sight L/Cs of amount due from foreign banks in currencies eligible as part of the. 
international reserves; and (9) real estate mortgage loans insured by the Home Financing Commission. 
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Table 10 
Incremental Effect of Trust Operations on Net Worth/Risk Asset Ratio 
as of Selected Months, 1988 (in percent) 
Bank A Bank B Bank C BankD BankE 
1. Trust Operations 
Risky Assets to 
Total Trust Assets a/ 21.03 40.74 66.49 65.83 34.15 
2. Balance Sheet 
Net Worth to Risky 
Assets 
I 
18.30 14.00 51.63 7,20 14.86 
3. Net Worth to 
Balance Sheet and 
Trust Operations 
Risky Assets 17.40 12.03 50.40 6.73 11.02 
4. Difference between 
(2) and (3) 0.90 1.97 1.23 0.47 3.84 
a/ Computed from survey results and financial statements of banks using Central Bank (CB) formula. 
These may be overstated since some loans (which were not deducted from total trust assets) might 
have been secured by deposits and hence should be appropriately deducted, per CB formula. Fbr 
Bank E, however, all secured loans were deducted from total trust assets. For Banks C and D, the 
results may have been further overstated since they could not have had investments in government 
securities which were not deducted due to lack of disaggregated Investments data. 
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investment management accounts. Under these types of accountabilities, the fund owners would 
have some say on the allocation of their funds. Available data as of selected months in 1987 and 
1988 show that Investment Management Funds/Accounts (IMAs) comprise 41.6 percent of 27 
banks' total trust liabilities. During the period 1984-1988, IMAs comprised 89 percent of the 
commercial banks' total fund management operation (FMO) accounts. 
Trust operations also contribute liquidity problems to the bank's normal operations when 
certain trust funds invested in long-term papers are withdrawn before their maturity date. These 
papers are sold either to the other trust accounts or the bank proper itself. Hence, the less liquid 
are the trust investments, the greater would be the liquidity problems they pose for the bank's 
normal operations. Based on the portfolio of the trust departments of all domestic commercial 
banks during the period 1984-1987, their non-liquid assets were estimated to reach an average of 
38.62 percent of total trust assets; for funds management operations, this reached an average of 
44 percent (Table l l ) . 1 0 
The liquidity profile of a bank's trust departments may be viewed in two ways. A higher 
liquidity ratio is preferred considering the abovementioned problem. On the other hand, a lower 
ratio is desired if savings mobilization objectives, i.e., lending of surplus funds to primary 
borrowers, are considered. Since the liquidity ratio of the trust and funds management portfolio 
of commercial banks is generally higher than their balance sheet portfolio, this suggests that 
banks were more conservative in managing trust funds, possibly to avoid liquidity problems. For 
the period 1984-1987, the commercial banks' average liquidity ratio for its balance sheet 
operations was 37.7 percent. 
The highly liquid operation of trust departments could be traced to the attractiveness of 
government securities to fund owners and managers. (A fund owner may prefer investing in 
securities through trust departments to lower his transaction cost, i.e., cost of 
information-gathering, travel, record-keeping, etc.). Available data for 1987 shows that around 43 
percent of the commercial banks' trust assets were invested in government securities. This 
proves that trust accounts could conveniently serve as captive buyers of government securities 
being underwritten by the banks. Moreover, the CB made compulsory the investment of 
government trust funds in Treasury bills, CBCIs (Central Bank Certificate of Indebteness) and 
other government securities, and savings and time deposits with government banks. And as cited 
earlier, CB requires that 75 percent of managed funds, the allocation of which are not stipulated 
in the agreements, be invested in the same assets. 
Preference for safe financial assets also seems consistent with the apparent preference for 
short-term loans (with maturities of less than one year) over long-term loans. Although 
industry-wide loan data is lacking, this is supported by an examination of the loans extended by 
the trust accounts of one of the top banks (Table 12). This bank's short-term trust loan in 1986 
10. Non-liquid assets are estimated by deducting from total assets cash, "COCI (checks and other cash items) and due from 
banks" (receivables), investments in money market instruments, investments in bonds, and other debt instruments. 
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Table 12 
Maturity Profile of Loans under Trust and Fund Management Operations 
of Sample Bank a/ (% of total loans) 
One Year More Than 
and Less One Year 
1983 
Trust 67.01 32.99 
Fund Management 37.34 62.66. 
Total 57.60 42.40 
1984 
Trust 65.44 34.56 
Fund Management 66.89 33.11 
Total 65.86 34.14 
1985 
Trust 78.51 21.49 
Fund Management 86.53 13.47 
Total 81.75 18.25 
1986 
Trust 95.05 4.95 
Fund Management 48.71 51.29 
Total 82.71 17.29 
1987 
Trust 89.89 10.11 
Fund Management 84.46 15.54 
Total 85.00 15.00 
1988 
Trust 58.71 41.29 
Fund Management 78.5.8 21.42 
Total 76.96 23.04 
a/ One of the top five in the trust and fund management industry. 
Source: Response to survey. 
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reached 95.5 percent of total trust assets. Note that for the same year the commercial banks' 
short-term balance sheet loans comprised 70.6 percent of their total assets (Table 13). 
D. Implications on Banking Industry Structure 
The banks' trust operations also have implications on the banking industry structure. As of 
1989, there are 28 commercial banks, three specialized government banks, eight thrift banks, and 
11 non-bank quasi-banks (NBQBs) authorized to undertake fiduciary operations.11 Clearly, this 
structure furthers the dominance of commercial banks as a group in the financial system. As of 
1988, NBQBs had total trust and managed funds which comprised merely 3.6 percent of those 
commercial banks. No data is available for thrift banks. 
As of 1988, the dominant banks in the trust market included the Philippine Commercial 
International Bank (14 percent), United Coconut Planters Bank (10.2 percent), Far East Bank and 
Trust Company (8.08 percent), Citytrust (8.7 percent), and Allied Bank (8 percent); all of these 
are universal banks (Table 14). They account for 49 percent of the trust industry, excluding the 
share of thrift banks and NBQBs. Among them, FEBTC's industry share had moved in the same 
direction as the Herfindahl index (HI) of concentration for the industry. This meahs that when 
FEBTC's share went up to 24 percent in 1986 from merely 12 percent in 1985, the HI also went 
up to .1099 from .085. Similarly, the HI went down to .0761 in 1988 when FEBTC's share 
dipped to only eight percent.12 This does not hold for the other banks, indicating the leadership 
of FEBTC in the industry. 
Also on the 1988 HI, it seems that the trust industry is less competitive than the commercial 
banking industry proper, as evidenced by their balance sheet operations. The HI for the latter is 
.06204 which is smaller than the HI of .08005 for the trust industry. In this sense, the trust 
operations of commercial banks have reinforced the suspected oligopolistic structure of the 
commercial banking industry. 
E. Implications on the Bank's Ability for Term-Transformation 
One function of banks as intermediaries of surplus funds is to transform its short-term 
liabilities into long-term assets. There are at least two ways by which a bank's trust operations 
could facilitate this. First, most common trust plans prohibit their withdrawal for a given period 
of time, normally one month. Thus, they could enhance the banks' source of long-term funds. In 
preceeding sections, it has been noted that some trust funds are deposited in long-term time 
deposits to evade reserve requirements. 
Second, surplus units with idle, short-term funds could participate in common trust funds 
invested in long-term papers which offer higher rates of return. Funds needed by withdrawing 
11. The nine thrift banks are: Asian Savings Bank, Banco de Oro, BPI Family, Home Bankers, Monte de Piedad, Planters 
Development Bank, Unitrust Development Bank, and Urban Development Bank. 
12. As of year-ends 1987 and 1988, however, FEBTC's fund management accounts comprised 73,6 percent and 68.7 percent 
respectively, of the commercial banks' total outstanding managed funds. 
CO 
Q> 
s 
CO 
00 
o> 
I o 
00 <J> 
TJ 
0) 
o 
o> 
c —. 
=5 c C 0) 
« o 
M © 
3 O. 
O = 
* ' 
o 
c 
. 2 
3 
JD 
V 
(A 
Q 
• c 
"ES 
CO 
00 
CT) 
LO 
00 
01 
oo 
(31 
CO 
00 o> 
CM CO CD 
oo 
O) 
o 
00 
CD 
CO o 
d r-- If) 
co 00 O) 
CO CO CO CO 
o CM 00 
5 CM 
^ 
CO CO 
d CO iri lO 
o O) 
d CO CO c\i 
73
.4
 
17
.3
 
CO 
d 
o 05 
CO h- d T—' 
nj 
CD 
c 
cfl 
w 
U) 
05 
C/3 
CO 
CD > » 
CO 
V 
(0 
CD > > 
LO 
CO 
26 
c 
to 
m 
TJ 
c 
12 
•a 
CD 
C CO C CQ O 
o c 
o5 = 
I ® 
E £ 
O V 
CD 
O 00 
W O) c 
o 
o o < 
<n 
2 
I -
! 5 g 
i IS 
I E 
DCn^MOHODOr^lri^lrioOOOil1 fl g g 
SSCSS8S&E33 "SSSMS^kSISSSSSSB § & 
r^ <\i<£i*CMtbftic>tjj«s 
s s s a s K & s s i T v n ft m i* «r is ( 
oi iti * ~ cvi csi «- i/> 
Sq t N O i A i i i n S s 
£&8IS88!B8i8s ri^t iN^jjjNftiria 
OOnOflONOOO^rt'irtrtirtOOOW^ Tt g g 
OOOiNVO'-OOOrONNOd 
£33333 SIRS cj oj tr> hJ ai 7- ddVdNoctidddr-dd^dr 
&888SS XSS' *5!?ES3l"«*3EgiS§ r n ^ pi p) n c\j 
s s s k ^ S s a w 6 r>in 63 hi <5 ^ « 6 
*HUl iU 
O r * Ocjo^-OOONO a 
lis. 1 5 _ _ . S 
8 K 
i § 
- s u s s fi-^'sSSsir i » 
a s 
- 8 
»8SK»5S(B8ftS$885S' I g (VJ ^  fs * rt tSI PJ 
3 8 SI 
"8 s 
. £ 
1 _ 
II c o 3 Tt B i o 
S. » 
? a 
E 
S H 
1 
•s 
participants is provided by new participants. Note that participation in common trust funds is 
made more attractive by higher interest rates offered to larger blocks of investments. 
Evidence, however, shows that trust departments did not seem to have performed well in 
long-term lending. As shown earlier by the trust loans' maturity profile ;of one of the top five 
banks' short-term assets are seemingly preferred. 
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
The tremendous growth of the trust and fund management operations of commercial banks 
have important effects on the commercial banks' solvency and liquidity. Yet, policies that 
address these are quite inadequate. 
Whereas banks are required to get the permission of trustors when trust accounts are involved 
in the purchase of properties from (or sale to) the bank proper, there is no parallel requirement for 
the bank's traditional depositors. Banks do not have to secure permission of their depositors and 
other creditors before they purchase uncollectible papers of their trust departments. Since the 
implementation of this latter condition is not feasible, the CB may consider the option of making 
such sale contingent on the bank meeting some minimum solvency and liquidity requirements. 
For example, the maximum collective amount of uncollectible papers to be sold should not 
increase the required networth to risk asset ratio and some liquidity ratio of the bank proper by a 
certain amount. 
In addition, the CB could consider the inclusion of the trust and funds management assets in 
the networth to risk asset ratio when monitoring the capital adequacy of commercial banks. At 
the very least, commingled trust funds with allocation at the discretion of the financial managers 
should be reflected. 
However, there are problems in fitting trust accounts and OBS activities in general into the 
present capital adequacy measures, the most important of which has to do with risk assessment. 
This is because the CB definition of the networth to risk asset ratio fails to consider the inherent 
differences in the riskiness of different asset classes, e.g., unsecured loans and investments in 
money market instruments other than government securities. Supervision in other countries, have 
employed more dynamic measures. For instance, the Bank of England assigns risk weights to 
different asset classes (Table 15). Thus instead of having the net worth to risk asset ratio defined 
simply as the CB does, they have the following capital adequacy ratio (CAR): 
CAR = Net Worth where Xi = fraction of portfolio invested in asset i 
L XiWi Wi = risk weight of asset i as determined by the 
Bank of England 
Table 15 
Bank of England Risk Asset Ratio 
Example Asset Weight 
Notes and Coins 0.0 
Deposits with Bank of 
England 0.0 
Foreign Currency 0.1 
Notes and Coins 0.1 
Treasury Bills 0.1 
Market Loans with Banks 0.2 
Gilts* up to 18 Months 
Maturity 0.2 
Gilts* over 18 Months 0.5 
Guarantees and Contingent 
Liabilities 0,5 
Advances 1.0 
Property 2.0 
"Government debt in the form of marketable stocks (i.e., saleable on the 
stock exchange) 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (1980), cited in Schaefer (1987). 
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Schaefer (1987) points out, however, that the interpretation of the weights is left vague, and 
the use of fixed risk weights is even less appropriate when considering contingent contracts. He, 
therefore, suggests the adoption of an adjusted risk weight instead of Wi, i.e. For example: 
A 
Zi = Zi = a i a i wip 
Za a i a i wap 
where, 
a i = fraction of asset i in portfolio 
a i = standard deviation of rate of return of asset i 
wjp = correlation between rate of return on asset i and the portfolio 
subscript a : refers to a numeraire asset, e.g., interbank call loans (IBCL). 
One of the features of the above approach is that it spells out the nature of the risk weight, 
i.e., it depends on the proportion of each asset class in the bank's portfolio and the covariance 
matrix of changes in asset value, as against, say, some arbitrarily determined Wi's. The Zi's also 
have a dynamic character in that they are unlikely to remain constant over time. Thus, this 
approach offers a potential tool for a better design of bank regulation and supervision by the 
CB. 
The CB is reported to have plans of increasing the reserve requirement on trust accounts. If 
the purpose is to tighten "security for the faithful performance of trust duties," this measure may 
not be appropriate. Firstly, the "security" has in practice been provided by the implicit guarantee 
that the bank proper extended, e.g., purchase of uncollectible trust accounts and the promise of 
income. Secondly, the increase in deposit requirements would only add on to the effective cost 
of intermediation for trust funds. Thirdly, the deposit requirement would not guarantee that 
trustees and trustors would become more risk-averse. On the contrary, their investment plans 
may include more risky but higher yielding assets to compensate for the reduction in income due 
to the required deposit with the CB. 
On the other hand, increasing the reserve requirement may simply be in line with the CB's 
policy of avoiding inflation tax (i.e., increasing money supply) which would further increase real 
interest rates. 
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